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This study examines and evaluates the existing research on party 
position in Taiwan and what this literature reveals about the state of inter-
party competition during the island’s first fifteen years of multiparty 
elections.  There has been an increasing diversity in methodologies used 
to measure party position in Taiwan, including mass and elite surveys, 
propaganda content analysis, and elite interviews.  Too much of the 
research has been carried out in isolation by individual researchers, 
however, with little reference to other existing studies.  Many studies 
have focused on single years and used completely different measurement 
systems, making time series analysis impossible.  There is a need for 
these schemes to become institutionalized and carried out by wider 
research teams rather than single scholars. 
This study argues that the existing data shows that between 1991 
and 2000 Taiwan’s parties moved from polarized positions toward a 
pattern of moderate differentiation, similar to parties in mature 
democracies.  Taiwan’s parties do stress issues, compete on multiple 
issue cleavages, and—although having shown a degree of movement 
toward the center—remain clearly differentiated.  The case is not so clear 
for the post-2000 period.  Party image surveys show signs of increased 
polarization.  However, while party propaganda analysis shows that the 
smaller parties have moved toward the poles, the difference between 
major parties has continued to blur. 
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Since Taiwan’s first full democratic elections in 1991, the island has 
experienced thirteen years of multiparty politics.1  A critical question for scholars of 
Taiwan’s political parties to ask is: To what extent has Taiwan institutionalized a 
healthy system of multiparty competition?  Have Taiwan’s parties followed a 
convergent pattern of competition in which, though ideological distance is limited, 
parties still offer voters consistently distinct platforms?  Or has competition been 
divergent, resulting in highly polarized parties with all its dangers for political 
instability?  Or has Taiwan followed the patterns prevalent in numerous “Third 
Wave” democracies of one-party hegemonic systems or an unconsolidated system of 
weak catchall parties and candidate-centered, issueless election campaigns? 
These are hotly disputed questions among Taiwanese political analysts.  Some 
studies have argued that Taiwan’s candidate-oriented elections leave little scope for 
either party- or issue-oriented voting behavior.2   Moreover, there are conflicting 
arguments regarding whether Taiwan’s parties have been converging or diverging.  
Wu Yu-shan (吳玉山 ) has argued that vote-maximizing strategies explain the 
movement of Taiwanese political parties toward the center in the 1990s.3  In contrast, 
a number of scholars have recently made the claim that Taiwan’s political parties have 
become more polarized than ever.4
In order to answer the above questions, it is essential to be able to identify the 
critical cleavages in electoral politics and to measure the positions that the main 
parties take on these issue spectrums.  The objectives of this paper are therefore to 
examine and evaluate research on Taiwanese party positions, and determine what 
these datasets can tell us about the state of inter-party competition in Taiwan. 
                                                 
1 I date the 1991 National Assembly (國民大會) election as the first full democratic election, as this 
was the first national election in which all the seats were up for election.  In contrast, only a minority of 
seats were open for competition in the 1986 and 1989 elections. 
2 Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (New York: Routledge, 1999), 44-47. 
3 Wu Yu-shan, “Moving toward the Center: Taiwan’s Public Opinion and Mainland Policy Shift,” 
http://www.taiwansecurity.org/TS-Wu.htm.  Also see Ming Ju-zheng, “Xiangxin jingzheng yu 
Zhonghua minguo zhengdang zhengzhi zhi fazhan” (Centrifugal competition and the development of 
the Republic of China’s party politics), Lilun yu zhengce (Theory and Policy) (Taipei) 12, no. 2 (1998): 
142-56. 
4  Since 2000 a number of scholars visiting London have made the claim that Taiwan’s political parties 
have become polarized.  For example, the School of Oriental and African Studies’ (SOAS) 2004 
Annual Taiwan Lecture by Edward Friedman was entitled, “Paranoia, Polarization, and Suicide: 
Unexpected Consequences of Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election,” www.soas.ac.uk/taiwanstudies. 
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This study argues that the general pattern of party movement in the 1990s is 
consistent, regardless of research methodology.  The existing party position data 
shows that between 1991 and 2000 Taiwan’s parties moved away from polarized 
positions toward a pattern of moderate differentiation, similar to parties in mature 
democracies.  In other words, Taiwan’s parties do stress issues, competition occurs on 
multiple issue cleavages, and the parties remain clearly differentiated despite having 
shown a degree of movement toward the center.  The concept of moderate 
differentiation corresponds with what Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman term 
“moderate extremism,” defined as “the mildly but not extremely divergent policy 
platforms that appear, empirically, to be characteristics of both two-party and 
multiparty competition.”5  The direction of party change is not so clear for the post-
2000 period.  The party image surveys and elite interviews show signs of increased 
polarization.  Content analysis studies from the post-2000 period also demonstrate 
that the smaller parties are moving toward the extremes, while the major parties have 
continued to converge. 
There has been an increasing diversity in methodologies used to measure party 
position in Taiwan, including mass and elite surveys, party propaganda content 
analysis, and elite interviews.  However, this body of work still has much room for 
improvement.  Too much of the research has been carried out in isolation by 
individual researchers, with little cross-referencing to other existing studies.  Also 
many studies have focused on single years and use completely different measurement 
systems, making time series analysis impossible.  There is a need for these schemes to 
become institutionalized and carried out by wider research teams.  I would also argue 
that there is potential for greater comparative use of party position data to compare the 
development of Taiwanese political parties with their counterparts in both mature and 
new democracies. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section one reviews the theoretical 
literature on party issue positions.  Section two both introduces the principal projects 
on measuring the positions of Taiwanese political parties and offers technical details 
of the datasets examined in this paper.  Section three then compares these studies’ 
findings on four empirical issues regarding the state of party competition in Taiwan: 
                                                 
5 Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity 
Spatial Models (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3-4. 
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(1) determining whether or not Taiwan’s parties stress issues; (2) identifying the key 
issue cleavages; (3) ascertaining whether parties stress different issues; and (4) 
identifying whether the parties converge or diverge.  The conclusion summarizes the 
main findings on measurement of party position in Taiwan, suggests the implications 
for inter-party competition in Taiwan, and offers some suggestions for future research 
in this area. 
 
 
Theories of Party Issue-Position Measurement 
Over the last three decades political science has given such increasing 
attention to the importance of political issues that Edward Carmines and James 
Stimson have commented: “To speak of politics is to speak of political issues.”6  Thus 
a definition of political issues is needed before we can review the main theoretical 
models supporting party issue-position measurements.  This is a contested question, 
with both narrow and broad definitions having been offered.  An example of the 
former is Colin Pilkington’s assertion that “Issues are contentious matters which help 
formulate and polarize public opinion.”7  Similarly, Dennis Kavanagh claims that the 
principal characteristics of political issues are (1) matters over which the public is 
sharply divided, (2) matters over which voters feel very strongly, and (3) matters for 
the solution of which voters look to particular political parties.8  Such an approach 
would limit the scope of study to positional issues or what Carmines and Stimson 
term “hard issues” for which voters need a sophisticated understanding to use as a 
basis for vote choice.  This study adopts a broader classification of political issues, 
however, which includes both valence issues and what Carmines and Stimson term 
“easy issues.”9  This definition would include symbolic issues both that deal with 
policy ends rather than means and that can be communicated simply even to apathetic 
and ill-informed voters. 
                                                 
6 Edward Carmines and James Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American 
Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 3. 
7 Colin Pilkington, Issues in British Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 2. 
8 Cited in ibid., 2-3. 
9 Edward Carmines and James Stimson, “Two Faces of Issue Voting,” American Political Science 
Review 74, no. 1 (1980): 78-91. 
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We can now examine how political scientists have theorized the measurement 
of parties on issue spectrums.  Mass survey data has been the most common method 
of placing political parties utilized by scholars applying variations of the Downsian 
proximity model and its related directional theory.10  The proximity model assumes 
that voters choose candidates with a policy position closest to their own views.  The 
optimal vote-maximizing strategy for candidates is to converge on the position of the 
median voter.  Therefore this model predicts a pattern of convergent competition.  In 
contrast, the directional theory predicts more divergent competition.  This theory 
assumes that voters chose candidates not based on policy proximity but on voters’ 
preferred direction of policy change.  Therefore, in order to stimulate voter support, 
parties should take contrasting and strong policy stands on the side of the issue most 
voters favor.  The directional model also predicts that parties will not benefit from 
taking vague centrist stances, as the center is “a neutral zone of indifference between 
two issue alternatives.”11  One caveat, however, is that parties cannot take positions 
that are too extreme, for voters will punish parties which go beyond “a range of 
acceptability.”  Both models rely principally on surveys which ask respondents to 
place themselves and political parties on policy spectrums.  While proximity models 
employ a 0-10 scale, directional theorists use a –5 to 5 scale.  Since the proximity 
form of questioning has been used in the U.S. National Election Surveys for several 
decades, this form offers valuable data on the extent the public sees parties as having 
changed over time (i.e., have converged or diverged). 12   Moreover, much 
measurement of party policy positioning using elite surveys is also based on 
proximity theory.  For example, the British Representative Study asks parliamentary 
candidates to place themselves on a number of ten-point policy scales.13
                                                 
10 The initial impetus of this tradition came from Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Voting (New 
York: Harper Rose, 1957).  A number of variations on Downs’ approach soon followed, such as Melvin 
Hinich and Michael Munger, Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1994); and Torben Iverson, “Political Leadership and Representation in West 
European Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994): 45-74.  For the directional 
alternative, see George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Macdonald, “A Directional Theory of Issue 
Voting,” American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989): 93-121.  For an approach combining 
proximity and direction, see Merrill and Grofman, A Unified Theory of Voting. 
11 Stuart Elaine Macdonald, Ola Lishaug, and George Rabinowitz, “Issues and Party Support in Multi-
Party Democracies,” American Political Science Review 85, no. 4 (1991): 1123. 
12 For example, see Alan Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered,” Journal of Political Science 38 
(1994): 1-24. 
13  For details of the British Representative Study, see http://www.pippanorris.com/data. 
 6
While proximity and directional theorists have relied on survey data, the main 
content analysis projects have been based on issue saliency theory.  Like the 
directional model, issue saliency theory and the related issue ownership theory predict 
party differentiation.  However, saliency theory offers an alternative view of party 
competition in which parties do not necessarily take confrontational stances on the 
same issues; instead, parties are more likely to “talk past each other”—i.e., are more 
likely to stress issues that favor their own side and ignore or deal cursively with issues 
that would either damage their own position or favor opponent parties.14  Therefore, 
the key objective of party leaders in electoral campaigns is to set the political agenda 
on issues that favor their party or damage their opponents.  Most electoral issues tend 
to be valence rather than confrontation positional issues; parties see the electorate as 
accepting one stance, and thus rather than arguing against the positions of other 
parties, prefer to target other more favorable but related issues.  For example, 
Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) is associated with political corruption and good 
economic governance; the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), for its 
part, is seen as promoting radical Taiwan independence, but also popular Taiwan 
identity appeals.  Therefore, the DPP should aim to keep the electoral agenda focused 
on both KMT corruption scandals and love for Taiwan, and play down its own 
Taiwan independence agenda and failures in economic management. 
Saliency theory does allow for party policy movement: parties will adjust 
policies or the saliency of issues in the hope of improving electoral fortunes.  
Movement is within ideologically delimited areas, however, and leapfrogging should 
be the exception.  Changing core party principles can prove a painstaking process, 
even when the positions in question are the equivalent of electoral suicide.  Party 
ideology tends to play a unifying role not only for party elite and activists but also for 
the party’s core supporters.  The difficulty of fundamental ideological change can be 
seen by the numerous failed attempts by reformers in Taiwan’s DPP to revise its 
Taiwan independence clause. 
Saliency theory has been the framework employed by the largest cross-
national party manifesto content analysis program, the Manifesto Research Group 
                                                 
14 Ian Budge, “Parties, Programs, and Policies: A Comparative and Theoretical Perspective,” American 
Review of Politics 14 (1993): 695-716; and John Petrocik, “Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections,” 
American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 825-50. 
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(MRG).15  This program involved a team of international scholars carrying out content 
analysis of the party platforms or manifestoes issued prior to election campaigns in 
twenty-five countries over the postwar period.  The MRG coding scheme contains 
fifty-six issue categories, and the scheme has proved to be applicable to varying 
political systems.  The proportion of issue mentions for left- or right-wing issues has 
been used to track party movement in these twenty-five countries on a left/right 
dimension.  In addition, this data has been used to plot changing party issue emphasis 
on single issues, such as UK parties’ stress on social welfare or European 
integration.16  As predicted by saliency theory, the MRG’s findings have tended to 
show that “parties are neither converging nor diverging consistently and seem to 
overall inhabit that same policy sectors now as they did immediately after the war.”17
 
 
Existing Research on Party Positions in Taiwan 
Ever since research on measuring party positions began in Taiwan in the early 
1990s, analysts have embraced a variety of methodologies to examine party 
competition in Taiwan.  This study examines the four main methods of measuring 
party position on the island: (1) public opinion surveys, (2) elite or expert surveys, (3) 
content analysis schemes, and (4) elite interviews. 
 
Public Opinion Surveys 
Survey data is the most popular method for measuring party position in 
Taiwan, with research having moved in two main directions.  First, in a series of 
nationwide surveys, researchers at National Taiwan University (NTU, 國立台灣大學) 
asked respondents if they view parties as representing certain policy or image 
opposites, such as tolerating or attacking corruption.  These surveys are able to show 
voter’s changing impressions of Taiwan’s political parties.  The surveys were carried 
out between 1989 and 1996, but unfortunately appear to have been discontinued since.  
                                                 
15 For an introduction to this project, see Ian Budge and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Finally! Over Time 
Mapping of Party Policy Movement,” in Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, 
and Governments, 1945-1998, ed. Ian Budge et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 19-50. 
16 Judith Bara and Ian Budge, “Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?” in Britain Votes 2001, ed. 
Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 26-41. 
17  Ian Budge and Judith Bara, “Manifesto-Based Research: A Critical Review,” in Budge et al., 
Mapping Policy Preferences, 58. 
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Moreover, their results have rarely been published.18  The only time this data has been 
employed to compare cross-party change was in Lin Chia-long’s ( 林 佳 龍 ) 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.19
In contrast, National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center (ESC, 國立
政治大學選舉研究中心) has taken a more orthodox proximity approach by asking 
respondents to place themselves and parties on key issue spectrums, such as 
independence vs. unification.  Such nationwide surveys have been carried out 
consistently since 1993.  These surveys have been employed by John Fuh-sheng 
Hsieh (謝復生) in a number of articles to show changing positions of both parties and 
respondents since the early 1990s.20  Similarly, Ming Ju-zheng (明居正) used this data 
to argue that Taiwan’s public opinion has had a centrifugal impact on Taiwan’s 
political parties.21  Perhaps due to the popularity of survey data in Taiwanese political 
science, the ESC’s party image methodology represents the most standard 
measurement method.  Although these studies are useful in showing the electorate’s 
party image, there may well be a discrepancy between this public image and that 
which the party wishes to project. 
 
Elite Surveys 
A method that has seen growing use in political science has been elite surveys.  
Such surveys involve either political scientists or politicians being asked to place 
parties on policy spectrums.22  Such elite surveys have been less popular in Taiwan.  I 
am only aware of one elite survey and one expert survey on party position: Lin Chia-
                                                 
18 One published work by You Ying-long used this dataset to compare party images across parties for 
1992.  See You Ying-long, Taiwan diqu shehui bianqian yu tezhi (Social transformation in Taiwan and 
its characteristics) (Taipei: Hanlu, 1996), 65-105.  Also Chen Ming-tong has tracked changes in the 
DPP’s image between 1989 and 1996; see Chen Ming-tong, “Minjindang de zhengdang xingxiang” 
(The DPP’s party image) (Paper presented at the Taiwanese Political Science Association Conference, 
December 1998). 
19 Lin Chia-long, “Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative Perspective” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 
University, 1998), 426-40. 
20 See, for example, John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, “Continuity and Change in Taiwan’s Electoral Politics,” in 
How Asia Votes, ed. John Fuh-sheng Hsieh and David Newman (New York: Chatham House, 2002), 
32-49. 
21 Ming, “Xiangxin jingzheng yu Zhonghua minguo zhengdang zhengzhi zhi fazhan.” 
22 F. G. Castles and Peter Mair, “Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements,” European 
Journal of Political Science 1, no. 12 (1984): 73-88; Michael Laver and W. B. Hunt, Policy and 
Political Competition (London: Routledge, 1992); and John Huber and Ronald Inglehart, “Expert 
Interpretations of Party Space and Party Location in 42 Societies,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 73-
111. 
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long used the NTU party image questions mentioned above for a sample of sixty-six 
legislators between 1995 and 1996,23 and Huber and Inglehart’s cross-national expert 
survey included left/right placement for three Taiwanese parties in the early 1990s.24  
Although these single-year studies have been useful for the placement of parties, the 
use of different measurement scales and the fact that these surveys have not been 
repeated subsequently have limited their value for showing party change. 
 
Content Analysis Schemes 
In mature democracies party election manifestoes or platforms issued prior to 
each election campaign are a rich data source on party policy priorities and have a 
long history as a source material to measure party change.25  Unfortunately, all the 
main parties in Taiwan have only issued such documents since 1998; therefore, these 
cannot be employed for the entire period of multiparty elections.26  The use of content 
analysis systems to measure party positions has been less popular in Taiwan than 
surveys have been.  Time series analysis is impossible, moreover, because the 
majority of attempts have been restricted to single election studies of the issue content 
of election propaganda, with each study having used completely different coding 
schemes.27  However, two individual researchers have recently carried out systematic 
content analysis of party documents to examine party change. 
Liu Tsung-wei (劉從葦) made the first attempt to apply the MRG framework 
to the Taiwan case.  He carried out content analysis of the candidate policy section of 
electoral gazettes for legislative elections (立法委員選舉) between 1989 and 1998.28  
Since this data is for individual party candidates, it reflects the policy preferences of 
                                                 
23 Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 434-42. 
24 Huber and Inglehart, “Expert Interpretations of Party Space and Party Location,” 73-111.  The third 
party examined was the short-lived Chinese Social Democratic Party (中華社民黨). 
25 For a review of manifesto research see Budge and Bara, “Manifesto-Based Research,” 51-74. 
26  Liu Tsung-wei, “Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change in Taiwan from 1989 to 1998” (Paper 
presented at the Taiwanese Political Science Association Conference, December 2000), 4. 
27 For example, see Zheng Zilong, “Yijiujiuwu nian dusanjie lifa weiyuan xuanju zhengdang jingxuan 
guanggao xunxi yu meiti celue fenxi” (An analysis of newspaper advertisements and media policy 
during the 1995 legislative election), Xuanju yanjiu (Journal of Election Studies) 3, no. 2 (1996): 1-32. 
28 Liu, “Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change,” 3-4.  These gazettes are issued to every voter a few 
weeks before the voting day.  These show a picture of each candidate, their party affiliation, work 
experience, education, and main policy goals. 
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politicians rather than the party center.  However, this study offers valuable time 
series information on candidates’ changing issue saliency and issue emphasis. 
I myself conducted the second content analysis study, which represents the 
first attempt to use newspaper campaign advertisements to measure party change in 
Taiwan.29  Newspaper ads are relatively easy to obtain, represent the public face of a 
party rather than that of only a single candidate, and receive considerable media 
attention in Taiwan.30  In countries where no manifesto is issued, content analysis of 
election newspaper advertisements offers a valuable alternative.  I carried out content 
analysis of all election newspaper advertisements covering nine national-level 
elections from 1991 to 200431 for the thirty-one days prior to voting day and from the 
three newspapers with the highest readership:32  China Times (中國時報, Zhongguo 
shibao), United Daily News (聯合報, Lianhe bao), and Liberty Times (自由時報, Ziyou 
shibao).33  In total 807 official party ads were analyzed from Taiwan’s major parties: 
the KMT, DPP, New Party (NP, 新黨), Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟), 
and People First Party (PFP, 親民黨).  This study also used a revised version of the 
MRG coding scheme; the details of this coding scheme are displayed in Appendix 1.  
In this research the advertising statistics used are for official ads, given that these 
reflect the party image the party center is trying to create.  In the first stage, the 
proportion of issue emphasis for each advertisement is calculated, and then this figure 
is used to find the proportion of issue emphasis for the party during the entire 
                                                 
29 Dafydd Fell first published this data in the article “Party Platform Change in Taiwan’s 1990s 
Elections,” Issues & Studies 38, no. 2 (2002): 31-60.  However, in this paper I employ a different 
dataset, as while in 2002 I used total ads statistics (including candidate, party center, anonymous, and 
support group ads), in this study I only use statistics for party center ads. 
30 One example was the wide media coverage given to Chen Shui-bian’s (陳水扁) 2000 presidential 
campaign advertisement showing a picture of his son in army uniform, saying, “Next year he will do 
military service, his father is Chen Shui-bian.”  See Lianhe bao (United Daily News), March 6, 2000, 7. 
31 The elections included for the National Assembly in 1991 and 1996; the Legislative Yuan in 1992, 
1995, 1998, and 2001; municipal executive (city mayors and county magistrates) in 1993, 1994, 1997, 
1998, and 2001; provincial governor in 1994; and the President in 1996, 2000, and 2004.  Although the 
municipal executive is a local office, the media treats these campaigns as national events.  Official ads 
refer to those clearly produced or financed by the party center or, in the case of presidential elections, 
by the official campaign headquarters. 
32 In 2000 a nationwide survey found the following readership figures: China Times 38 percent, United 
Daily News 36.7 percent, and Liberty Times 35.4 percent.  See Zhang Ying-hua and Fu Yang-zhi, eds., 
Taiwan diqu shehui bianqian jiben diaocha (Social change in the Taiwan region: A basic survey project) 
(Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2000), 91. 
33 These three papers also reflect the main political currents, with China Times closer to the mainstream 
KMT, United Daily News sympathetic with both the non-mainstream KMT and the NP, and Liberty 
Times closer to the DPP. 
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campaign.  For example, if the KMT had ten newspaper ads in one year and 25 
percent of issue mentions in each ad were in favor of greater welfare spending, then 
the KMT’s average percentage of issue mentions for the issue category of welfare 
state expansion would be 25 percent.  This data can offer information on both the 
relative party issue emphasis over a single campaign, and position or issue emphasis 
change over the entire decade.  Moreover, the data can show if the parties are 
converging toward the center or diverging toward the poles. 
 
Elite Interviews 
The final and most common method of measuring party change has been 
qualitative analysis of data sources such as party documents, propaganda, and elite 
interviews.  This has been popular in the Taiwan case.  For example, Shelley Rigger 
and Julian Kuo’s (郭正亮) separate treatments of the developments in the DPP relied 
heavily on interviews and participant observation.34  This qualitative approach can 
give the reader a colorful portrait of party developments, though it is of greater value 
when used in conjunction with other quantitative sources. 
In this current study, I make reference to a series of in-depth elite interviews I 
conducted in two periods of fieldwork in Taiwan in 2000 and 2001.  Requests for 
interviews were sent to over one hundred politicians and I interviewed a total of sixty-
six experienced Taiwanese politicians.  My main criteria for selection were either 
politicians that had been involved in a minimum of three national-level elections or 
those that held important decision-making positions in their parties after 1991.  The 
respondents included thirty from the DPP, twenty-two from the KMT, nine from the 
NP, and five from the PFP.35  On average each interview lasted forty-five minutes.  
Most questions focused on the perspectives politicians held on their parties’ changing 
campaign issue emphasis over the 1990s. 
 
 
                                                 
34 Shelley Rigger, From Opposition to Power: Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner, 2001); and Julian Kuo, Minjindang zhuanxing zhi tong (The DPP’s painful transition) 
(Taipei: Tianxia wenhua, 1998). 
35 The reason for the lower KMT number was a higher refusal rate. 
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Results of Existing Research on Party Position in Taiwan 
This section compares the findings of existing studies on party position to see 
what they can tell us about the state of party competition in the first decade of 
multiparty elections.  I examine the findings these studies offer on the following 
empirical issues: (1) whether or not Taiwan’s parties stress issues; (2) identifying the 
key issue cleavages; (3) ascertaining whether or not parties stress different issues; and 
(4) identifying whether or not the parties converge or diverge. 
 
Do Taiwan’s Parties Stress Issues? 
Content analysis schemes are the optimum source for answering the question 
of whether Taiwan’s parties stress issues in their election propaganda.  As mentioned 
earlier, Taiwanese elections have the reputation for being candidate- rather than issue- 
or party-oriented.  However, separate studies by both Liu Tsung-wei and myself 
found that, on the contrary, Taiwanese parties do give considerable attention to 
electoral issues in their propaganda.  In Liu’s study a mere 4.5 percent of quasi-
sentences36 on the policy section of election gazettes between 1989 and 1998 fell into 
the “others” category.37  In my newspaper ad study, only 10.1 percent of quasi-
sentences in the three main parties’ newspaper election ads between 1991 and 2000 
fell into the “others” domain.38   In short, we can conclude that during election 
campaigning Taiwanese parties do stress issues in their election propaganda. 
 
What Are the Key Issue Cleavages? 
The next question is what are the critical issues in Taiwanese electoral politics.  
Is it correct that the sole salient issue in Taiwanese politics is national identity, with 
alternative cross-cutting cleavages having failed to appear?  If this is the case, then 
there exist inherent dangers for Taiwan’s parties to compete on a single polarized 
                                                 
36 A quasi-sentence is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue.  Since one sentence may 
include a number of arguments, sentences may be divided into quasi-sentences, which can be marked 
off by commas, semicolons, or colons.  For details see Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences, 96-
103. 
37 Liu Tsung-wei, “The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan 1989-1998: With 
Particular Reference to the Single Non-Transferable Vote” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Essex, 
2002), table 8.1. 
38 Dafydd Fell, “Party Change and the Democratic Evolution of Taiwan” (Ph.D. dissertation, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2003), table 1.2. 
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issue.  The tragedies of the former Yugoslavia have vividly shown the dangers of 
ethnic conflict in countries emerging from authoritarian rule. 
Table 1 shows issue saliency using five indices: (1) the top ten issues from my 
own official newspaper ads content analysis, (2) the top ten issues from Liu Tsung-
wei’s election gazette content analysis,39 (3) my 2001 elite survey, (4) Lin Chia-long’s 
1995-96 elite survey, and (5) a 1996 NTU mass survey.40  According to my official ad 
dataset, if party and candidate categories are excluded, the most salient issues are 
political corruption, Taiwan independence, government competence, and democracy.  
Using a similar coding scheme but different dataset, Liu found welfare state 
expansion by far the issue most stressed by Legislative Yuan candidates.  In fact the 
only issue falling into both top ten lists was political corruption.  To check the validity 
of these findings I asked Taiwanese politicians, “What have been the most salient 
political issues in Taiwan’s elections over the last decade (1991-2001)?”  The results 
show some support for both content analyses top ten lists, with a consensus among 
politicians that the most influential issues of the decade were national identity, 
political corruption, the economy, and social welfare.  The results of Lin Chia-long’s 
elite survey and the NTU mass survey also showed similar patterns, with both 
politicians and the general public seeing socioeconomic issues as the most pressing 
concerns.  In fact out of the five studies, national identity is only among the top four 
issues in my elite survey.  The premise that national identity is the sole significant 
issue in Taiwanese politics must be questioned.  Instead, Taiwan’s public and 
politicians clearly give equal—if not more—attention to alternative issues such as 
political corruption, social welfare, the economy, and crime. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Do the Parties Stress Different Issues? 
Of course, if Taiwan’s parties stress the same issues, then we would not expect 
voters to vote according to policy differences.  A number of scholars have pointed out 
the importance of policy difference in an electoral democracy.  For example, Ian 
Budge and Judith Bara note that “the essential democratic requirements for an 
electoral mandate policy are that there is some difference between parties so electors 
                                                 
39 See note 37 above. 
40 Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 578-79. 
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can make a choice, and that once elected the party will do more or less what it 
promised to do when in government.”41  Therefore, we must next ask if the evidence 
shows that Taiwan’s parties offer distinct issue emphasis.  Here the initial evidence 
appears contradictory, for while my newspaper ad content analysis scheme and elite 
survey show that parties do stress different issues, Liu’s election gazette survey shows 
a higher degree of overlapping issue emphasis.  Table 2 shows which issues from the 
major parties’ top ten lists overlap and which ones are exclusively stressed or owned 
by one party according to my newspaper ad and Liu’s election gazette content 
analysis schemes.  My data shows that other than positive and negative references to 
parties, the only issue in the top ten for all three parties is political corruption.  In 
terms of issues, the DPP and the KMT have little in common; even the NP and KMT 
share only a concern for opposing Taiwan independence.  In contrast, the lists for 
issues exclusively owned by single parties are far longer.  The DPP has dominated the 
national identity issues of Taiwan independence and Taiwan nationalism, along with 
freedom, human rights, and welfare state expansion.  Since the KMT ruled Taiwan 
from 1945 until 2000, it is not surprising that the party has also owned political 
stability, economic growth and prosperity, law and order, and government 
competence issues.  The NP, in turn, has stressed better relations with the PRC and 
has emphasized peace due to its frequent warnings of war with China.42
[Table 2 about here] 
In contrast, Liu’s data shows much more overlap in the parties’ top ten issues, 
with actually far fewer issues exclusively dominated by any single party.  There are 
some similarities, however, as both show Taiwan independence dominated by the 
DPP and better relations with the PRC controlled by the NP.  Here the difference can 
partly be explained by the use of different datasets: my study only includes newspaper 
ads issued by the party center, while Liu’s study is of the policy proposals of 
individual Legislative Yuan candidates.  This fact may imply that while the policy 
positions of party headquarters are highly differentiated, party candidates take more 
moderate stances. 
                                                 
41 Ian Budge and Judith Bara, “Introduction: Content Analysis and Political Texts,” in Budge et al., 
Mapping Policy Differences, 9. 
42 Promoting better relations with the PRC comes under the issue category of “special foreign relations: 
positive.”  This includes calls for increased economic and cultural exchanges between Taiwan and the 
PRC. 
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Lastly is a comparison of the two content analysis schemes with my interview 
data.  I asked elite respondents, “What issues have you and your party stressed most 
over the last decade?”  The findings are shown in table 3.  Although politicians from 
all parties agree that their most stressed issue was national identity, the remaining top 
four issues show the parties’ dissimilarities: the economy, stability, and prosperity 
were most stressed by the KMT, while political corruption, democracy, and social 
welfare were the purview of the DPP.  In short, although both my content analysis and 
elite survey show party differentiation in issue emphasis, this interpretation is 
challenged by Liu’s gazette study. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Convergence or Divergence? 
Next is an examination of whether the main party position datasets support the 
contention that Taiwan’s parties are converging or diverging on the central issue 
cleavages.  By looking in more detail, moreover, we can see whether the parties also 
differ significantly on the level of single issues.  I examined the patterns of party issue 
emphasis for these datasets on the following salient dimensions: national identity, 
social welfare, and political corruption. 
National identity: The first issue to be examined is national identity.  The goal 
is to test the claims that the main parties moved toward the center during the 1990s, 
but then became more polarized after the change in ruling party. 
First, the ESC survey data shows support for the line of argument that the 
KMT moved toward the center under Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), and then back to the 
right after 2000.43  Figure 1 shows the results of a series of ESC surveys asking 
respondents to place themselves and the main political parties on an 
independence/unification spectrum, with 0 representing the fastest possible 
independence and 10 meaning unification as soon as possible.  The results show that 
the public does see the parties as being wide apart on this issue.  The KMT is seen to 
have moved toward the center, from 6.8 in 1994 to 6.1 in 1996.  Following the 
turnover of power, however, the party has reached its most right-wing position of 7.2 
under Lien Chan (連戰) in 2001.  The DPP is seen to have followed a fluctuating 
course, moving from 3.0 in 1994 to reach its record left-wing position of 2.0 in 1996 
                                                 
43 ESC data was supplied by Professor Sheng Hsing-yuan (盛杏湲) from the ESC. 
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when fronted by the Taiwanese nationalist Peng Ming-min (彭明敏 ).  The DPP 
showed a degree of moderation in 2000 following Chen Shui-bian’s election, reaching 
3.2; however, the party is seen to have once again shifted to the left in its first year in 
office, at 2.6 in 2001.  The NP is seen to have swung to the right in 1998 and 
continued this move toward the pole in 2001 when it reached 7.6.  In another 
worrying sign, both new arrivals on the political scene in 2001 are viewed as radical, 
with the PFP placed at 7.2 and TSU at 2.6.  In short, the ESC surveys support the 
thesis that party platforms showed some moderation in the 1990s, but became more 
polarized after 2000. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Table 4 shows the results of the NTU surveys which asked respondents if they 
see the parties as supporting independence or unification.44  Once again, the three 
parties are seen as quite distinct, with the KMT being viewed as the most supportive 
of the status quo, the DPP as pro-independence, and the NP as pro-unification.  There 
is no sign that the DPP has moderated its position on this question.  Like the ESC data, 
the impression that the KMT under Lee Teng-hui has moved from unification toward 
the status quo is supported with a fall in number of respondents seeing the KMT as 
supporting unification from 67.7 percent in 1992 to 33 percent in 1996.  Unfortunately, 
this NTU dataset appears to have been discontinued, so it is uncertain whether the 
NTU survey findings would have differed from those of the ESC in the late 1990s. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The two content analysis studies also show a similar pattern of party 
differentiation and limited movement.  Figure 2 plots the official parties’ newspaper 
ad issue emphasis on the unification/independence spectrum.  The figures for Taiwan 
independence are reached by subtracting the scores for Taiwan independence.  A 
positive score represents support for Taiwan independence, while a negative score 
represents an anti-Taiwan independence stance.  This figure also offers strong support 
for party differentiation, with “Taiwan independence: positive” dominated by the DPP, 
and “Taiwan independence: negative” shared by the NP and KMT.  There have been 
no cases of the KMT or NP leapfrogging the DPP.  The figure shows that the KMT 
and DPP became highly polarized in 1991 with a 40-point gap in their Taiwan 
independence scores, with a gap of over 20 points being maintained until 1996.  Since 
                                                 
44 Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 437. 
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1997 there has been a degree of convergence, as the gap has narrowed dramatically 
since the issue was de-emphasized.  However, although the DPP and KMT have been 
less polarized since 2000, they are still differentiated.  The DPP has not shown a 
consistent trend toward moderation on the Taiwan independence issue.  Although 
there was a fall in Taiwan independence emphasis after 1991, the DPP increased focus 
on the issue from 1994 to 1996, and moderation seems to begin only in 1997.  Then 
the party again paid more attention to Taiwan independence in both 2000 and 2004.  
My results for the KMT ads show a more consistent pattern of opposition to Taiwan 
independence over the decade.  Figure 2 shows that the NP has repeatedly taken a 
strong anti-Taiwan independence stance.  It even took a radical swing to the right in 
2000, reaching record levels of emphasis in 2000 and 2001.  As for the two new 
parties, figure 2 shows that while the TSU has clearly taken an even more pro-Taiwan 
independence stance, the PFP has tried to stay clear of the issue in its propaganda. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
My findings on this issue correspond with Liu’s content analysis of the policy 
proposals of legislative candidates.  He also found that the parties held widely 
disparate stances during the 1990s, with the KMT close to the center, the NP most 
anti-independence, and the DPP the pro-independence party.  Moreover, there is a 
similar pattern of change for the DPP, which increased emphasis on Taiwan 
independence in the early 1990s yet de-emphasized the issue in 1998.45
In my interviews, most DPP respondents agreed that from 1992 the party de-
emphasized Taiwan independence in favor of other issues.  The idea that the DPP has 
simply made an adjustment to, rather than having completely abandoned, Taiwan 
independence cropped up repeatedly in interviews.  For example, DPP Tainan Mayor 
Hsu Tien-tsai (臺南市長許添財) stated, “I don’t think it’s a change; it’s a modification 
not a change.  Nothing has changed…”46  Similarly, DPP legislator Yen Chin-fu (顏錦
福) remarked that it has been the DPP’s spin not substance that has changed, noting 
that the DPP’s Taiwan independence ideals “have not changed.  We have been 
looking for the right way to propagandize our ideals that can be more acceptable to 
the people.”47
                                                 
45 See note 37 above. 
46 Author’s interview with Hsu Tien-tsai, Tainan, August 25, 2001. 
47 Author’s interview with Yen Chin-fu, Taipei, September 28, 2001. 
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There is more disagreement within the KMT over the degree of change both 
during the Lee Teng-hui and post-Lee eras.  Most politicians remaining in the KMT 
agree that Lee gave the party a more localized image.  According to KMT advertising 
expert Fu He-kang (伏和康), “Before 1994 the KMT’s position was clearer, it was 
anti-Taiwan independence, so [the party was] always attacking people as being pro-
independence.  After 1994, however, they began to use the language of localization 
and betraying Taiwan, and became less direct in their censure of opponents, talking of 
loving Taiwan.”48  However, many also feel that the party has not actually forsaken 
positions set in the early 1990s, such as the Guidelines for National Unification (國家
統一綱領 ) and the “one-China” principle.  KMT politicians often stress the 
consistency in the KMT’s national identity positions.  For instance, according to 
former Kaohsiung Mayor Wu Den-yih (前高雄市長吳敦義), “The KMT’s position on 
national status has always been the most conservative and steady.”49
The public impression that the KMT has swung back to the right since 2000 is 
also reflected in the views held by KMT politicians.  Some see a return to the KMT’s 
core values, while others see an unwelcome rightward shift.  The late KMT legislator, 
Wei Yung (魏鏞), falls into the former category, stating, “I had a strong conviction 
that sooner or later the KMT would revert to its original path.  I was completely 
convinced that the KMT couldn’t completely disown its party position.  It was only a 
matter of time.”50
The pattern of change in the NP closely matched that found in my advertising 
analysis and party image surveys, as politicians from all the NP’s factions agreed that 
the party had swung to the right of the identity spectrum after 1998.  For instance, the 
political scientist and former NP magazine editor Yang Tai-shun (楊泰順) recalled, 
“In the summer of 1995, I could definitely say that the NP was not a pro-unification 
party.  Of course, now if you say the NP is a pro-unification party, I cannot 
disagree.”51  This move was viewed as a welcome return to orthodoxy by such 
Chinese nationalists as Hsieh Chi-ta (謝啟大), who commented, “For a while the NP 
                                                 
48 Author’s interview with Fu He-kang, Taipei, November 1, 2001. 
49 Author’s interview with Wu Den-yih, Nantou (南投), October 8, 2001. 
50 Author’s interview with Wei Yung, Taipei, November 5, 2001. 
51 Author’s interview with Yang Tai-shun, Taipei, November 1, 2001. 
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seemed to have lost its ideals, it forgot them, but now we’re proclaiming them loud 
and clear.”52
The above data shows that politicians’ views on the direction and degree of 
change closely follow both the patterns found in my advertising analysis and the 
perceptions of party change among the general public.  Although Taiwan’s parties are 
seen to have changed, the change has not been too radical.  Parties are still seen as 
distinct and most voters still perceive a wide gap between themselves and Taiwan’s 
parties on core electoral issues.  During the 1990s, the parties were moving away from 
polarized positions on national identity, and toward a pattern of moderate 
differentiation.  There are, however, clearly some signs of post-2000 polarization. 
Social welfare: Most studies examining party position in mature democracies 
attempt to place parties on a left-right scale.  However, Taiwanese analysts tend to 
argue that Taiwanese parties do not compete on such a spectrum.  The content 
analyses by both Liu and myself have attempted to track party movement on the 
MRG’s left-right scale and both found that the DPP tended to have more left-wing 
issue emphasis than the KMT.53  However, since the most significant left-right issue 
in Taiwanese politics is social welfare, tracking party movement on this spectrum 
makes more sense. 
The ESC asked respondents to place themselves and the main parties on a 
social welfare vs. economic growth spectrum in which promoting social welfare 
equals 0 and promoting economic growth equals 10.  The results for surveys in 1994, 
1996, and 1997 (shown in figure 3) show a consistent pattern of the DPP and NP 
being viewed as more pro-social welfare and the KMT more pro-economic growth, 
with the respondents locating themselves close to the center.  Unfortunately the 
wording of the question was altered to distinguish maintaining the existing social 
welfare system and actively promoting social welfare; the results of the modified 
2000 survey are shown in table 5.  The trend here is even clearer, however, with the 
DPP being seen as by far the most pro-social welfare expansion, the NP located close 
to the center, and the KMT the most passive on the issue. 
[Figure 3 & table 5 about here] 
                                                 
52 Author’s interview with Hsieh Chi-ta, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001. 
53 This corresponds with the pattern found in Huber and Inglehart’s expert survey.  See Huber and 
Inglehart, “Expert interpretations of Party Space and Party Location in 42 Societies,” 107. 
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Figure 4 shows the three parties’ relative social welfare issue emphasis 
fluctuation in my study of official newspaper election ads between 1991 and 2004.  
As with the survey data, there is a clear pattern in official party ads, with the DPP 
dominating the issue and almost no leapfrogging between the DPP and the KMT or 
NP.  The parties placed most stress on social welfare between 1993 and 1995 and then 
again in 2000.  Throughout the decade, the NP has given the least stress on welfare.  
Since the change in ruling party in 2000, however, the issue has been de-emphasized 
by all parties. 
My elite interviews found a number of significant patterns of party change.  
First, there was a consensus among respondents that the DPP did begin to give 
welfare more attention from the early 1990s and maintained this dominance in most 
subsequent elections.  As the KMT legislator Apollo Chen (陳學聖 ) lamented, 
“Looking back over the last ten years, if there is one issue that the DPP has controlled, 
then it is the pensions issue.”54  Second, there was a shift within the KMT from the far 
right to the center right of the welfare spectrum, so that most in the party agreed with 
an expansion of contributory welfare schemes—as long as the welfare system 
favoring pro-KMT occupational groups was maintained.  Therefore, the KMT moved 
to steal certain DPP welfare proposals such as National Health Insurance (全民健保).  
Third, the welfare issue was highly divisive for the KMT, with some factions 
promoting universal schemes and others opposing change.  Lastly, the degree of KMT 
movement on the issue should not be exaggerated: though accepting National Health 
Insurance, the party remained hostile to universal pensions. 
In short, while both the newspaper ad data and my elite interviews show that 
the DPP has dominated campaign emphasis of the welfare issue since 1993, survey 
data shows these welfare campaigns have rubbed off on voters, as the public have a 
clear image of the DPP as the most pro-welfare party.  The de-emphasis of social 
welfare since 2000 may, however, imply a convergence and blurring of party 
differences on the issue. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Political corruption: We discussed above how political corruption is 
undoubtedly one of the most salient issues in Taiwanese electoral politics.  Since this 
is a valence issue, however, few Taiwanese scholars have attempted to track party 
                                                 
54 Interview with Apollo Chen, Taipei, September 28, 2001. 
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movement on this cleavage.  For example, ESC surveys have not seriously dealt with 
party image change on this question.55
The only party image survey that I have been able to locate that shows cross-
party change on the corruption issue was a series of United Daily News surveys 
carried out between 1992 and 1996.  These are displayed on table 6.  This table shows 
that the percentage of respondents seeing the KMT as clean dropped from 37 percent 
in 1992 to 25 percent in 1996—against a corresponding rise for the DPP from 26 
percent to 41 percent.  The percentage of respondents seeing the KMT as corrupt rose 
from 28 percent in 1992 to 45 percent in 1996—against a corresponding fall for the 
DPP from 29 percent to 22 percent.56
[Table 6 about here] 
I also examined party movement on the corruption issue in my newspaper ad 
content analysis.  Figure 5 plots the parties’ relative issue emphasis on political 
corruption in official newspaper ads between 1991 and 2004.  A similar pattern is 
shown, with the issue having been dominated by the DPP, and to a lesser extent by the 
NP.  Other than 1996 when the main parties largely ignored the issue, there were only 
two cases of the KMT leapfrogging the DPP.57  In a sign of continuity, the DPP still 
dominated anti-corruption attacks in the first election after the change in ruling party 
in 2001.  Figure 5 also reflects the high saliency of the issue: the issue of political 
corruption has been heavily stressed in every election.  In short, the data shows that 
the parties are again differentiated on this issue, with the KMT increasingly seen as a 
corrupt party, and the DPP’s clean image continuing to improve. 
My elite interviews also showed a number of related party change trends on 
this issue.  First, politicians agreed that the DPP did initiate the anti-corruption issue 
in the early 1990s and dominated it in later elections.  Second, the DPP progressively 
broadened the scope of its anti-corruption efforts, from attacking vote buying, KMT 
party assets, gangster politics, and central government corruption.  Although 
traditionally having ignored or even tacitly encouraged corruption, the KMT gradually 
moved to accept the opposition’s views on many corruption sub-issues.  For example, 
                                                 
55 The NTU survey does contain a question asking respondents if they see parties as tolerating or 
attacking corruption.  However, this data has only been published for the case of the DPP.  See Chen, 
“Minjindang de zhengdang xingxiang,” 25. 
56 Christian Schafferer, “The 1997 City Mayor and County Magistrate Elections in Taiwan,” 26-27.  
http://www2.uni-linz.ac.at.fak.SoWi/gespol/DOWNLOAD/elactact.doc. 
57 In 1997 DPP newspaper ads focused on the crime issue, while its TV ads stressed political corruption. 
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after years of defending its right to run a huge business empire, the KMT accepted the 
need to reform its party assets in 2000.  However, as with the social welfare issue, 
KMT change of stance on the political corruption issue was heavily constrained; as a 
result, the party has struggled to brush off its corrupt image. 
In short, the newspaper and interview data reveal that the DPP placed the anti-
corruption issue on the agenda in the early 1990s, and has dominated it since.  
Moreover, surveys show that once the image of the KMT as corrupt—and the 
opposition parties as clean—was forged, it has remained set in the public imagination 
even after the change in ruling party. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has examined the existing research on party position measurement 
in the first fifteen years of Taiwan’s democratic elections.  The results between 1991 
and 2000 are encouraging for the state of Taiwan’s party competition.  Taiwan’s 
parties have followed a pattern of moderate differentiation in which parties do stress 
issues, compete on multiple issue cleavages, and—although having shown a degree of 
movement toward the center—remain clearly differentiated.  The jury is still out for 
the post-2000 period, however, with the ESC surveys detecting signs of increased 
polarization. 
This paper has also revealed that there is still much room for improvement in 
the study of party position in Taiwan.  Too much research has been carried out in 
isolation by individual researchers, with little reference to other existing studies.  Also 
many studies have focused on single years and used completely different 
measurement systems, making time series analysis impossible.  The ESC party image 
surveys have been the most consistent and orthodox method for plotting party change.  
However, it is important that these questions be continued in the new Taiwan Election 
and Democratization Study surveys.  The content analysis schemes offer a fresh 
perspective on party change in Taiwan.  These were carried out by Ph.D. researchers, 
and now need to be institutionalized and continued by wider research teams.  Now 
that parties are regularly issuing election manifestoes, content analysis of this source 
should be carried out.  Elite surveys are the least developed of the three methods.  The 
ideal solution would be to devise for Taiwanese legislators a system similar to the 
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British Representative Survey.  New challenges for research include measuring the 
positions of the new parties that have emerged since 2000, and also to find what issue 
cleavages will eventually replace the issues that dominated the campaigns of the 
1990s.  Finally, there is also room for greater comparative use of party position data to 
contrast the development of Taiwanese political parties with their counterparts in both 
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1. This table compares Taiwan’s top ten election issues using five different studies.  
2. The Fell content analysis study shows the top issues for the KMT, DPP, and NP in their official 
newspaper ads between 1991 and 2000.  The source is Fell’s content analysis of 583 official party 
newspaper ads from the nine national-level elections between 1991 and 2000.  See Dafydd Fell, 
Party Politics in Taiwan (London: Routledge, 2005), table 2.2. 
3. Liu’s top ten list represents the top issues for all Legislative Yuan candidates between 1989 and 
1998.  The numbers in brackets are average percentage of issue mentions.  The source is Liu 
Tsung-wei’s content analysis of the policy proposals of legislative candidates in election gazettes.  
See Liu Tsung-wei, “The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan 1989-1998: 
With Particular Reference to the Single Non-Transferable Vote” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Essex, 2002), table 8.1. 
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4. The Fell top elite issues are based on interviews with 61 experienced Taiwanese politicians, and 
specifically their reply to the question: “What have been the most salient political issues in 
Taiwan’s elections over the last decade (1991-2001)?”  See Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan, table 
2.2. 
5. Lin Chia-long’s elite survey shows the top ten issues in his survey of 66 legislators between 1995 
and 1996.  The question Lin posed was: “Which of the following issues do you consider as the 
most important and pressing?” See Lin Chia-long, “Paths to Democracy: Taiwan in Comparative 
Perspective” (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1998), 578-79. 
6. The NTU survey was carried out after the 1996 presidential election.  There were 1,383 total 
respondents.  See Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 578-79. 
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Table 2 
Overlap in Issue Emphasis Top Ten Lists 
 
 Fell’s Content Analysis Study Liu’s Study 
Only KMT Political stability; party-government 
competence; other parties’ lack of 
government competence; economic 
growth and prosperity; law and order; 
party negative: violence 
Productivity, agriculture, and farmers 
Only DPP Pure Taiwan independence; diluted 
Taiwan independence; freedom and 
human rights; social justice; welfare 
state expansion; Taiwan nationalism; 
non-economic demographic groups; 
candidate positive 
Taiwan independence: positive; democracy; 
free enterprise 
Only NP Special foreign relations: positive; 
peace; education expansion; national 
way of life: positive; environmental 
protection; culture 
Special foreign relations: positive; efficiency 
of the Legislative Yuan 
KMT & DPP  Environmental protection 
KMT & NP Taiwan independence: negative; 
candidate: negative 
Law and order; middle class and professional 
groups 
DPP & NP Democracy Political corruption 
All Three 
Parties 
Political corruption; party: positive; 
party: negative 
Technology and infrastructure; social justice; 
welfare state expansion; education expansion; 
non-economic demographic groups 
 
Note: This table shows the degree of issue emphasis overlap from parties’ top ten tables shown in 
Fell’s and Liu’s content analysis studies. 
 
Sources: Fell’s content analysis of 583 official party newspaper ads from each national-level election 















Elite Views on Issue Saliency and Ownership 
 
Question: 
What issues have you and your party stressed most in elections over the last decade (1991-
2001)? 
 
KMT DPP NP 






1. National identity 
2. Money politics 
3. Democracy 




1. National identity 
2. Money politics 
3. Economy 




Note: The top elite issues rankings are based on Fell’s interviews of sixty-one experienced Taiwanese 






Party Images on the National Identity Issue (1992-96) 
 
Question: 
Do you think the KMT/DPP/NP is a party that supports Taiwan independence (TI), 
unification (CU), or the status quo (SQ)? 
 
 The KMT is a party that 
supports: 
The DPP is a party that 
supports: 
The NP is a party that 
supports: 
 TI CU SQ TI  CU SQ TI CU SQ 
1992 1.3% 67.7% 3.5% 65.9% 2.1% 2.7% N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1993 1.8% 63.9% 6.5% 65.9% 3% 3.5% N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1996 7.3% 33% 22.7% 66.4% 1.4% 3.8% 4.1% 36% 16.9%
 
Source: Lin, “Paths to Democracy,” 437. 
 
Note: This table shows the proportion of respondents seeing the main parties as supporting Taiwan 
independence, the status quo, or unification.  The number of cases was 1,384 in 1992; 1,398 in 1993; 




Party Image on Social Welfare (2000) 
 
Question: 
Where would you place yourself and the main parties on a spectrum in which passively 




Respondent KMT DPP NP PFP 
5.6 4.8 6.5 5.2 5.3 
 
Note: 89.1 percent of respondents could place themselves; 69.2 percent could place the DPP and KMT; 
48 percent could place the KMT, DPP, and NP; and 44.5 percent could place all four parties. 
 





United Daily News Survey on the Percentage of Respondents Viewing the 
KMT/DPP as Clean or Corrupt (1992-97) 
 
 KMT is clean DPP is clean KMT is corrupt DPP is corrupt
1992 37 26 28 29 
1993 32 41 36 19 
1994 31 39 34 17 
1995 23 41 43 20 
1996 25 41 45 22 
1997 21 47 50 23 
 
Note: This table shows the percentage of respondents viewing the main parties as being either clean or 
corrupt in six national surveys carried out by the United Daily News. 
 






Revised Manifesto Research Group Coding Scheme 
 
Domain 1: External Relations 
101: International relations: positive 
102: International relations: negative 
103: Anti-imperialism 
104: Military: positive 
105: Military: negative 
106: Peace 
107: Internationalism: positive 
108: European Community: positive 
 
 
109: Internationalism: negative 
110: European Community: negative 
111: Taiwan independence: positive 
111A: Pure Taiwan independence 
111B: Diluted Taiwan independence 
112: Taiwan independence: negative 
112A: Taiwan independence: negative 
112B: Chinese unification 
Domain 2: Freedom and Democracy 
201: Freedom and human rights 
202: Democracy 
 
203: Constitutionalism: positive 
204: Constitutionalism: negative 
Domain 3: Political System 
301: Decentralization: positive  
302: Decentralization: negative 
303: Government and administrative efficiency 
304: Political corruption 
 
305: Political authority 
305: Political stability 
305B: Party/government competence 
305C: Other parties’ lack of government 
competence 
Domain 4: Economy 
401: Free enterprise 
402: Incentives   
403: Market regulation 
404: Economic planning 
405: Corporatism 
406: Protectionism: positive 
407: Protectionism: negative 
408: Economic goals 
409: Keynesian demand management 
 
410: Productivity 
411: Technology and infrastructure 
412: Controlled economy 
413: Nationalization 
414: Economic orthodoxy 
415: Marxist analysis 
416: Anti-growth economy 
420: Economic growth and prosperity 
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Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life 
501: Environmental protection 
502: Culture 
503: Social justice 
504: Welfare state expansion 
 
505: Welfare state limitation 
506: Education expansion 
507: Education limitation 
Domain 6: Fabric of Society 
601: Chinese nationalism 
601T: Taiwan nationalism 
602: National way of life: negative 
603: Traditional morality: positive 
604: Traditional morality: negative 
 
605: Law and order 
606: Social harmony 
607: Multiculturalism: positive 
608: Multiculturalism: negative 
Domain 7: Social Groups 
701: Labor groups 
702: Labor groups: negative 
703: Agriculture and farmers 
 
704: Middle class and professional groups  
705: Underprivileged and minority groups 
706: Non-economic demographic groups 
Domain 9: Candidate and Party 
901: Candidate: positive 
902: Candidate: negative 
903: Party: positive 
 
904: Party: negative 





1. The categories featuring in my case study chapters are in italicized/bold print. 
2. This revised MRG coding scheme is similar to the one used by Liu Tsung-wei. 
 
Sources: Budge et al., eds., Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and 
Governments, 1945-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Appendix 3; and Liu Tsung-wei, 
“The Effects of Electoral Laws on Party Competition in Taiwan 1989-1998: With Particular Reference 
to the Single Non-Transferable Vote” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Essex, 2002), table 7.1 
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